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Essay
The New Overcrowding
JONATHAN SIMON
American prisons are seriously overcrowded, perhaps more than ever in our
history. Before the era of mass incarceration, prisoner advocates sought to build
on progressive penological ideas about the proper standards for housing
prisoners, which focused on one person to each prison cell to create a
jurisprudence of overcrowding that might compel states to reduce their reliance
on incarceration. The goal failed, and states adopted tough new sentencing laws
that increased imprisonment. As the prison book got under way, the Supreme
Court decisively rejected the one person to a cell rule in the 1981 case of Rhodes
v. Chapman. This Essay returns to this failed jurisprudence to argue that it has
been outdated by a fundamental transformation in the nature of prison
overcrowding. Before mass incarceration, overcrowding was primarily a product
of antiquated prisons and the reluctance of states to pay for new modern facilities
to better fit the then dominant rehabilitative objectives. While overcrowding was a
problem, states had effective tools to deal with it, especially parole laws that
allowed centralized administrative boards to control the pace of prison releases.
Mass incarceration has created a new type of overcrowding, one that is far more
severe and enduring than in the past. This new chronic hyper overcrowding plays
out in a context where prisoners serve much longer sentences, have less access to
rehabilitative programs, and greater unmet needs for medical and mental health
treatment. The old overcrowding led to conflicts and riots. The new overcrowding
leads to inhumane treatment and sometimes tortuous suffering on a routine basis.
With states having eliminated parole mechanisms for the majority of prisoners, the
time is ripe for the courts to recognize that the new overcrowding has rendered
past precedents out of date and invalid. We need a new jurisprudence of
overcrowding; one that recognizes the need for a hard constitutional limit, like
one prisoner to one cell. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brown v. Plata
suggests that the Court is now aware of the magnitude of the problem and lower
courts have begun to test the applicability of a strengthened overcrowding norm
more appropriate to the age of mass incarceration.
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The New Overcrowding
JONATHAN SIMON*
I. INTRODUCTION: HYPER-CHRONIC
OVERCROWDING AS A NEW PENOLOGICAL PROBLEM
As Jeff Bleich pointed out in an insightful comment written at the
beginnings of mass incarceration in California, there is something funny
about the concept of “overcrowding”:
The term “overcrowding” is redundant at best, since
crowding already refers to a higher level of social density
than is desired. At worst, the term begs one of the central
questions posed by this Comment—namely, at what point
does a prison’s population become so great that the risks to
prisoners’ health and safety outweigh society’s demand that
the prisoners be punished, or that the prisons simply become
administratively unmanageable.1
Bleich goes on to an important critique of the way prisoner-advocates,
prisons, and courts were using overcrowding at that time. Prisoners and
their advocates were using overcrowding to attack a range of actual
features of incarceration (including, one might add, imprisonment itself).2
Prison managers were often eager to use court-mandated reforms to
achieve their own agenda for investments in the prison.3 Bleich worried
that due to these institutional incentives, overcrowding jurisprudence might
lead to a paradoxical situation—one where more success by prisoners in
establishing constitutional violations on overcrowding grounds might lead
to more imprisonment, and where the underlying problems facing prisoners
remain unsolved.4 Some scholars of punishment now believe that this is
*
Adrian A. Kragen Professor of Law, UC Berkeley; Faculty Director, Center for the Study of
Law & Society.
1
See Jeff Bleich, Comment, The Politics of Prison Crowding, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1125 n.2
(1989).
2
See id. at 1127 (“[P]risoners embrace the perception of crowding as an opportunity to reduce
their sentences. Prisoners’ rights advocates depend upon crowding to get into courts to pursue other
improvements in prison conditions.”).
3
See id. (“Prison administrators, prison employees, and legislators advocating the current prison
building program benefit institutionally from the perception of crowding. Prison administrators benefit
because this perception supports their demands for more personnel, larger budgets, and stricter controls
over prisoners, and because it permits them to escape blame for prison disturbances.”).
4
See id. at 1128 (“[B]ecause the debate now focuses on crowding, the term may be used in place
of or even to mask other serious defects in the prison system. Prison managers may be
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part of the dynamic that led to mass incarceration in states under court
orders, where prisoner lawsuits forced fiscally conservative state
legislatures to increase investment in the prison just as other political
forces aligned to make increasing imprisonment a popular political
position.5
This Essay returns to the failures of overcrowding jurisprudence in the
period leading up to mass incarceration, but from the perspective of a new
overcrowding that has come to characterize many American prisons in the
era of mass incarceration. The old overcrowding was rooted in the
antiquity of most state prisons as these populations began to grow in the
late 1970s and early 1980s.6 Some states keen on advancing new hopes for
a rehabilitative penology had built new prisons in the 1950s and 1960s that
were typically targeted at the most promising prisoners; these smaller and
more specialized prisons added little to the state’s overall prison capacity.7
To handle the great majority of their prisoners, almost all states in the
1970s relied on one or more prisons built during the last great prison boom
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.8 These prisons, dubbed
“Big Houses” after the facades of some of the more influential nineteenth
century ones (a term then immortalized by Hollywood in the twentieth
century), were generally large and organized around tightly stacked tiers of
cells.9 These prisons typically suffered from significant problems in
heating and cooling, inadequate plumbing, and contained little space for

misdiagnosing—or intentionally misstating—the sources of current prison problems because of the
ease of attributing difficulties to crowding. Accordingly, many of the programs currently funded by
legislatures to combat crowding may be unsuccessful because they are ill-suited to the true underlying
problems.”).
5
See MONA LYNCH, SUNBELT JUSTICE: ARIZONA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
PUNISHMENT 1–2 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2010) (“[A] mere 25 years after what looked like the demise,
or at least the diminution of incarceration, the national imprisonment rate had nearly quintupled to 410
prisoners per 100,000 population.”); Heather Schoenfeld, Mass Incarceration and the Paradox of
Prison Conditions Litigation, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 731, 731–32 (2010) (discussing increased
incarceration rates during and after the 1970s).
6
See Bleich, supra note 1, at 1129–30 (“In absolute numbers, the nation’s incarcerated population
is at an all-time high; there are almost 630,000 people in state and federal prisons—more than three
times as many as in 1970. As of 1985, there were 150,000 more prisoners than America’s prisons were
designed to accommodate.”).
7
See Michelle S. Phelps, Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Between Rhetoric and
Reality in U.S. Prison Programs, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 33, 36 (2011) (discussing the prevalence of the
rehabilitative ideal in the 1950s and its decline in the 1970s).
8
See Bleich, supra note 1, at 1145 (describing the relationship between rising prison populations
and prison construction rates).
9
See Stefanie Evans, Comment, Making More Effective Use of Our Prisons Through Regimented
Labor, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 521, 523 (2000) (“In the 1950s, the ‘Big House’ dominated the prison scene.
The typical Big House prison consisted of many large cell blocks on multiple tiers, and on average it
held 2,500 men.”).
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accommodating more prisoners after double celling.
While overcrowding was a problem in some states before the
beginnings of mass incarceration, most states had a significant tool to
combat it: parole. State sentencing laws typically allowed for the early
release of prisoners well before the end of their judicially imposed
sentences.11 In theory, parole boards were supposed to consider early
release (as well as the parallel question of when parolees—released
prisoners under supervision in the community—who have violated the
conditions of parole should be returned to prison) only in terms of how
much risk the person posed to public safety.12 However, prison experts
have long believed that these boards used their discretion to manage state
prison populations and head off the internal tensions and riots that
overcrowding could lead to.13
In the era of mass incarceration, a new kind of overcrowding has
emerged that I call “hyper-chronic” overcrowding.14 It is “hyper” in the
sense that it is “extreme.” Before mass incarceration, prison experts
considered anything above 90% of the design capacity to be
overcrowded.15 During mass incarceration, the most overcrowded states
operated at well above 120% of capacity.16 California, the locus of the
landmark case Brown v. Plata,17 had long operated at nearly 200% of
design capacity at the time the court order authorizing relief of
10
James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead: Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm Change, and the
Supreme Court, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1003, 1013 (1997) (“The Big House was a walled prison with large
cell blocks that contained stacks of three or more tiers of one-or-two-man cells. On the average, it held
2,500 men. Sometimes a single cell block housed over 1,000 prisoners in six tiers of cells. . . .
Overall . . . cell blocks were harsh worlds of steel and concrete, of unbearable heat and stench in the
summer and chilling cold in the winter, of cramped quarters, and of constant droning, shouting, and
clanking noise.”); Evans, supra note 9, at 523 (describing the poor living and sanitary conditions inside
“Big House” prisons).
11
See Bleich, supra note 1, at 1147 (“Prior to 1970, prison administrators were better able to
adjust prison populations through flexible parole criteria. As prison populations increased, parole
boards frequently advanced parole dates or took slightly greater risks with parole candidates in order to
ease the burden on a prison.”).
12
Sheldon L. Messinger et al., The Foundations of Parole in California, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
69, 81–84 (1985) (providing the original intentions of parole programs).
13
See, e.g., Phelps, supra note 7, at 36 (“[T]here was a growing consensus that the indeterminate
mode of sentencing (whereby inmates were released by parole boards that ostensibly decided whether
an inmate was ‘rehabilitated’) was an unacceptable model, with critics on the left focusing on the racial
disparities produced by the system and commentators on the right complaining about ‘liberal’ judges
and parole boards ‘coddling’ offenders.”).
14
JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND
THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 110 (2014).
15
Bleich, supra note 1, at 1142 n.80.
16
See, e.g., Pamela M. Rosenblatt, The Dilemma of Overcrowding in the Nation’s Prisons: What
Are Constitutional Conditions and What Can Be Done?, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 489, 489–90, 490
nn.6–7 (1990) (discussing the history of mass incarceration overcrowding).
17
131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
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overcrowding was upheld and entered. “Chronic” means something that
is enduring or occurring again and again.19 Before mass incarceration,
overcrowding was episodic, partially because it was tied to crime waves or
other sources of episodic increases in law enforcement or severity.20 One
expects that a number of important social and political forces (e.g., racial
tensions and strikes) influenced imprisonment rates even within the largely
steady pattern that persisted before mass incarceration. Overcrowding
under mass incarceration is enduring and it arises from structural features
of the sentencing and criminal justice systems that are relatively
independent of crime and other social factors. In California, for example,
despite building twenty-two new prisons, overcrowding was present
throughout the growth and stabilization of mass incarceration, and stayed
at or near 200% of capacity system-wide for well over a decade, until
forced by the courts to reduce to 137% of design capacity, a level reached
only this past spring.21 However, even this accomplishment was achieved
only by keeping some ten thousand prisoners either in county jails or
private prisons out of state (both at great expense). Moreover, California
Governor Jerry Brown has expressed concern that overcrowding could rise
again without further changes in sentencing laws.22
Hyper-chronic overcrowding presents a very different problem for
prisoners and prison workers than the old overcrowding, and it lends itself
to a very different kind of organizational adaptation. The old overcrowding
18

18

Id. at 1923–24.
See, e.g., Chronic, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/chronic [https://perma.cc/KH3R-G82M] (defining this term as meaning, among
other things, “continuing or occurring again and again for a long time”).
20
See Bleich, supra note 1, at 1144–46 (describing the historical flux in prison crowding).
21
After several extensions California reached the level in the spring of 2015, prior to the
December final deadline, thanks to (1) legislative changes introduced in 2011 known as Correctional
Realignment that diverted non-serious, non-sexual, and non-violent felons from state prison, Bob
Egelko, Crime Down, Costs Up Since Prison Realignment, Study Finds, S.F. GATE (Sept. 29, 2015),
http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Crime-down-costs-up-since-prison-realignment-6536236.php#pho
to-3198399 [https://perma.cc/SX8J-LF9B], and (2) Proposition 47, a 2014 ballot initiative that freed
some existing prisoners by allowing their felony convictions for non-violent drug and property crimes
to be reduced to misdemeanors, Melody Gutierrez, California Prisons Have Released 2,700 Inmates
Under Prop. 47, S.F. GATE (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/California-prisonshave-released-2-700-inmates-6117826.php [https://perma.cc/CD6Y-PLXD].
22
Governor Jerry Brown expressed this concern in a conference call with reporters announcing
his support for a ballot initiative that would allow parole release consideration for people in prison for
non-violent felony convictions. See John Myers, Gov. Brown to Seek November Ballot Initiative to
Relax Mandatory Prison Sentences, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/lapol-sac-jerry-brown-sentencing-reform-ballot-20160127-story.html
[https://perma.cc/K88A-9EFQ]
(discussing Governor Brown’s proposals concerning a referendum aimed at rehabilitation and reducing
California’s prison population).
19
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led to discomfort, conflicts, and the risk of riots. The new overcrowding
leads to a routine lack of medical care and mental health care, leading to
higher levels of suicide, death, and instances of extreme pain amounting to
torture––conditions which were the driving considerations in Brown v.
Plata.24 Prisons responded to the old overcrowding internally with a
combination of discipline and restraint, and at the system level by using
parole mechanisms to reduce the population over time.25 Prisons in
California have responded to the new overcrowding by relying on a racebased gang classification system to establish internal mechanisms for
conflict and conflict resolution among prisoners, and also through
lockdowns, cell extractions, and other forms of emergency style
management.26
In retrospect, the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in Rhodes v.
Chapman27 was a fateful bridge on the road (or if you will, with poetic
license, the Rhodes) to mass incarceration. Lower courts had been citing
overcrowding as a ground for finding constitutional violations, but there
was no clear Eighth Amendment standard for overcrowding. Given the
coalescence of many prison experts and the American Correctional
Association’s accreditation standards around a one prisoner for one cell
standard, many prison advocates hoped the Supreme Court would establish
such a standard.28 Already, in Bell v. Wolfish,29 the Court had suggested
that it saw no “one man, one cell principle lurking in the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”30 In Rhodes, the Court faced the issue
squarely in the context of a new prison built as part of the pre-mass
incarceration effort to expand rehabilitative penology, but which had
gradually become overcrowded as incarceration rates began to rise in the
late 1970s.31 The Court rejected an overcrowding doctrine based on the one
person to a cell standard, pointedly noting that there was no constitutional
right to “comfortable prisons.”32
23

See Bleich, supra note 1, at 1132–37 (describing the dangers which obtained in overcrowded
prisons in 1989, including inmate violence, inmate health, and the overtaxing effect on prison
management).
24
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).
25
See Bleich, supra note 1, at 1147–49, 1159–60 (describing the strategies used to manage or
reduce prison crowding).
26
Second Amended Complaint, Mitchell v. Cate, No. 2:08-cv-01196-RAJ (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2011).
27
452 U.S. 337 (1981).
28
See Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980) (stating that the “[ACA]
Manual provides that in a detention facility there should be one inmate per room or cell”).
29
441 U.S. 520 (1979). The case dealt with pretrial detainees and thus relies on the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, but for prison conditions the
analysis is essentially the same.
30
Id. at 542.
31
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 339, 340–42.
32
Id. at 349.
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Had Rhodes come out the other way, mass incarceration would likely
not have happened. With an Eighth Amendment requirement to achieve
one prisoner to a cell, the escalation of people being sent to prison and the
lengthiness of sentences would have been stopped in its tracks by a hard
constitutional line that states could never have afforded to overtake through
prison building, and the Supreme Court would have been reluctant to
reverse. Instead, Rhodes gave the green light to sustain overcrowding by
state prison systems, and helped assure that prison condition lawsuits,
where successful, would drive a process of prison expansion that would
lead to an ever-growing prison population, along with enduring
overcrowding.
However, the Supreme Court’s recognition of the new overcrowding in
Brown may signal a new opportunity for judicial development of
overcrowding as a distinct Eighth Amendment doctrine. The long-term
goal should be to reduce Rhodes to its facts on the grounds that it no longer
makes sense to apply it to a new kind of prison system and a new kind of
overcrowding. In the meantime, lower courts can use this gap to craft
meaningful limits on overcrowding, and even establish a “one person per
cell” rule without waiting.
II. THE OLD OVERCROWDING
Prison overcrowding is almost repetitive as a term. In the history of
prisons, they have rarely operated below their design capacity,33 which
may suggest that the size of the prison estate establishes, in effect, a
minimum size of the prison population. Overcrowding as a social problem
has largely been concerned with prisons, or with housing for the poor (i.e.,
prisons are another form of housing for the poor). For much of its history,
prison overcrowding has been primarily a function of the extremely high
capital costs of building new prisons, which makes the marginal cost of the
last prisoners stuffed into the old prison dramatically lower than that for
the first prisoner placed in the new prison. As pressure built on prison
overcrowding at the end of the nineteenth century, most states adopted
laws permitting early release (known as parole, from the shortening of the
French phrase for “word of honor,” a ritual by which military prisoners
were traditionally allowed to leave confinement on the promise not to
return to the field of battle).34 In theory, parole was supposed to be based
on an administrative judgment that the prisoner had been effectively
rehabilitated and, with proper aftercare (parole supervision which was
invented at the same time), could return to the community with little risk of
33

Claudia Angelos & James B. Jacobs, Prison Overcrowding and the Law, 478 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 100, 101 (1985).
34
Paul J. Larkin Jr., Parole: Corpse or Phoenix?, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 303, 306–08 (2013).
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35

further criminal behavior. While imperfect, there is little doubt that
parole allowed prison managers to regulate the level of overcrowding.
Perhaps because of this, overcrowding was never defined as a distinct
Eighth Amendment issue during the most active period of prison condition
lawsuits between 1960 and 1990.36
A. The Old Penal Estate
On the eve of mass incarceration—the decade of the 1970s—the prison
“system” (a term only applicable to the largest prisons at the time) in most
states consisted of one or two penitentiaries—older prisons built typically
in the nineteenth century and expanded during the crime wave of the
1920s.37 These “Big House” style prisons typically consisted of stacked
tiers of cells.38 In the most reform-oriented and richest states, like
California, Illinois, and New York, the 1950s saw development of a new
generation of rehabilitation-oriented prisons, typically aimed at younger,
more “treatable” people convicted of felonies.39 These smaller prisons
experimented with dormitory-style rooms in place of cells, combined with
plentiful space for examining, training, educating, and treating inmates.
Throughout the 1960s, rising crime rates40 likely led to a natural
increase in prison overcrowding (although data is not easily available for
this period). Most of this would have been concentrated in the Big House
style prisons, with the newer, smaller prisons protected as much as
possible. But Big House prisons, with their cellular design based on
solitary confinement at night41 (from the New York or “Auburn” model
35

Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282, 284–85 (1972).
See Angelos & Jacobs, supra note 33, at 102–07 (explaining that through the 1970s and 1980s
overcrowding of prisons was “not viewed as unconstitutional per se”—rather, courts had to determine
if “crowding has caused deprivation of basic human needs before they can order relief”).
37
See Rosalind K. Kelley, Comment, Sentenced to Wear the Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovation in
Sentencing—Are They Constitutional?, 93 DICK. L. REV. 759, 763 (1989) (noting the rise in the use of
the penitentiary system “during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries . . . , which became the primary
goal of punishment in the early 1900s”).
38
Evans, supra note 9, at 523.
39
See LYNCH, supra note 5, at 2 (“[D]uring the 1970s, faith in the rehabilitative ideal that had
prevailed in penology for the past century began to erode among criminal justice practitioners,
academics, and policymakers.”). For one of the most ambitious such efforts in California, see ELLIOT
STUDT ET AL., C-UNIT: SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY IN PRISON 56 (1968) (describing rooms with
windows and doors rather than bars at Deuel Vocational institution, which was designed for younger
prisoners).
40
See Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in
the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1032–34 (2010) (recounting several of the reasons for the
rise of crime rates of the 1960s).
41
On the design of the Big House style prison, see REBECCA MCLENNON, THE CRISIS OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776–1941,
at 56 (2008) (“[C]ellular incarceration . . . of the convicts by night and their impressment into silent,
congregate labor . . . by day”).
36
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that had won out over its full-time solitary confinement competitor in
Pennsylvania in the nineteenth century),42 set some hard limits on
overcrowding. One might have been able to place two prisoners in those
cells, but any more than two was hard to configure, let alone manage
without riots. More importantly, these prisons lacked flexible space in
which more prisoners could be held. Indeed, the original Auburn style
prisons had mainly cell tiers and factory-style spaces.43 Removing the
(increasingly archaic) industrial equipment and putting in bunk beds would
have been a possibility to create more space, but that would have required
completely abandoning any pretense of reform inside prison, which
remained a key premise behind parole. Fortunately, parole offered an
imperfect way to regulate the prison population.
B. Parole and the Regulation of Prison Populations
Parole has typically been promoted as either a means of incentivizing
efforts at rehabilitation by prisoners, or criticized as a mechanism that
undermines the deterrence of the criminal law by offering the hope of
leniency in the end. Students of prisons as organizations, however, have
tended to see parole as a mechanism to help prisons manage population
pressures.44 In most states, it is local officials, police, sheriffs, prosecutors,
and judges who determine how many people will be sent to prison through
felony convictions, and in turn, sentenced to a term in state prison. In
contrast, prison officials have no power to refuse admission to a person
sentenced by a court (unless they are in an emergency), but they may be
able to influence exits from prison through parole. This is complicated by
the fact that in most states the paroling authority had (or still has) some
independence from the prison administration.45 Even so, the paroling
authority is part of the same executive branch of state government, and
subject to pressure from the chief executive to avoid the scandal that would
ensue following a riot or escape resulting from intolerable overcrowding.46
The most systematic effort to study parole as a regulator of state prison
populations, was based on the research by Sheldon Messinger and his
42
See Ryan S. Marion, Note, Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment Case Against
State Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 213, 218 (2009) (contrasting the Auburn
style prison with the harsher, less productive Pennsylvania model for penitentiaries).
43
Id.
44
See Peter B. Hoffman & Michael A. Stover, Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms:
Equity, Determinacy, and the Parole Release Function, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 90 (1978) (recognizing
the variety of governmental actors that play a role in the conviction and sentencing process).
45
See id. at 92–93 (noting the considerable “discretion to control . . . [prisoners’] release date[s]”
through the “parole function,” and arguing for the “creation of independent releasing authorities . . . [in
the form of] parole boards”).
46
See id. at 116 (highlighting that “[t]o alleviate overcrowding, a parole authority can make
immediate but smaller changes more equally throughout the prison population”).
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colleagues on the California prison population before 1980, and showed
that parole release rates did increase during times of heightened
overcrowding.47
The other mechanism through which parole administration can
influence prison population is administrative decisions to return to prison
people previously released, on the basis of a parole violation (that has not
also resulted in a new criminal conviction). In times of population
pressure, parole authorities can use their powers to reduce the number of
parolees returned to prison on parole violations. Research, again on
California, has shown that it is very likely that this happened during
Governor Ronald Reagan’s second term—when the increasing crime rate
resulted in increasing pressure on the prison population, and the anti-tax
Governor wanted to avoid expensive new prison construction.48
C. Overcrowding and the Eighth Amendment
Despite being critical to many successful Eighth Amendment claims
during an era of federal efforts to reform state prisons, overcrowding never
received definitive constitutional treatment as a distinct evil, but instead
only as part of a “totality of circumstances” that constituted cruel and
unusual punishment.49 For example, in upholding a sweeping order against
Arkansas’ overcrowded prisons, the Supreme Court noted that crowding
exacerbated problems like violence, and inadequate medical and dental
care.50 Accordingly, courts were more likely to invoke “basic human
needs” such as “food, clothing, medical care and safe and sanitary living
conditions[,]”51 “unnecessary [or] wanton [infliction of pain,]”52 and
“minimal measure of the necessities of civilized life.”53
Moreover, when the Supreme Court faced two cases presenting the
issue of overcrowding without extensive records showing these other
conditions, the majority refused to find a constitutional violation.54 “Both
cases make it clear that double-bunking and exceeding design capacity are
47

See Richard A. Berk et al., Prisons as Self Regulating Systems: A Comparison of Historical
Patterns in California for Male and Female Offenders, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 547, 548, 573 (1983)
(“Our argument . . . [is] that prison officials have, with an eye toward crowding, attempted to regulate
growth, and that parole in particular has been applied to this end.”).
48
Rosemary Gartner et al., The Past as Prologue: Decarceration in California Then and Now, 10
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 291, 292 (2011).
49
Angelos & Jacobs, supra note 33, at 102.
50
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 n.6, 684 (1978).
51
Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013). For a glimpse into prisons’ recognition of
these “basic human needs” around the time of Hutto, see NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE & ELYCE H. ZENOFF,
SANCTIONS, SENTENCING, AND CORRECTIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 380, 382–84, 396 (1981).
52
Angelos & Jacobs, supra note 33, at 105 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981)).
53
Id. at 105.
54
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979).
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not, in and of themselves, impermissible. The minimum requirements for
inmate housing recommended by experts and model standards are not
mandated by the Constitution.”55
According to Bell v. Wolfish, a case applying the Due Process Clause
to pretrial custody in a jail setting, overcrowding only violates the
Constitution when it causes “genuine privations and hardship over an
extended period of time.”56 Additionally, in Rhodes v. Chapman, an Eighth
Amendment case on a prison setting, the Court stated that overcrowding
only became a constitutional problem when it led to “deprivations of basic
human needs” and “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.”57
III. RHODES V. CHAPMAN: THE LOST CHANCE
TO STOP MASS INCARCERATION
Rhodes marks the beginning of the end for the period of expansive
federal rights for prisoners.58 Although it left in place many precedents
establishing overcrowding as part of unconstitutional conditions, and
plenty of room for willing district courts to distinguish its outcome, Rhodes
signaled a decisive shift back in the direction of the once dominant “hands
off” rule that sub voce was said to have all but insulated state prisons from
federal court challenges. The rhetoric of Justice Powell’s majority opinion,
with a sneering rejection of a right to comfortable prisons, fits right in line
with the increasingly punitive and degrading “tough on crime” rhetoric that
was becoming firmly established in the electoral branches of the state and
federal governments. All of this would be enough for contemporary
reformers to see Rhodes as one of many decisions by the Supreme Court in
the 1980s and 1990s that permitted the war on crime and ultimately mass
incarceration to run its course. Rhodes has a particularly standout role,
however, in mass incarceration. Put simply, an enforceable one-person,
one-cell rule for long-term imprisonment (the kind of per se rule that the
Court was eager to reject) would have ended mass incarceration in its
cradle. Prison populations in the states had already been growing for nearly
five years when Rhodes was decided.59 Stimulated in part by federal court
orders to relieve overcrowding, states were beginning to launch prison
construction programs that would multiply by several times the entirety of
the prison estate that had been created up to that time. But despite the
unprecedented wave of new prisons, most state systems remained
55

Angelos & Jacobs, supra note 33, at 106.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 523, 542.
57
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 339, 347.
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MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 47–48 (1998).
59
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS 1925–81, at 1 (1982),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p2581.pdf [https://perma.cc/A426-WYT7].
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overcrowded throughout the prisoner boom, overwhelmed by sentencing
laws that raised prison years faster than the states could afford to build
prisons. Double celling would become a norm in the prison systems of
mass incarceration. Had double celling in long-term prisons been found
unconstitutional in 1981, states would have been compelled to undergo the
kinds of revisions of their sentencing and parole laws now being
undertaken. Instead, new laws were piled on in the 1990s, increasing time
served in prison, eliminating the opportunity for parole procedures to
address prison overcrowding, and establishing mass incarceration as a new
kind of penal model.
A. The Single Cell Standard in Correctional Thought
The single cell standard dismissed by the Supreme Court as an
aspirational, rather than constitutionally required norm, had been embraced
by the two leading norm-setters for United States prisons during this
period, the American Correctional Association’s Commission on
Accreditation for Corrections and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The
amicus brief filed by the United States in Rhodes is devoted to calling
attention to the then quite recently promulgated “Federal Standards for
Prisons and Jails,” establishing “one inmate per cell or room” and further
stating sixty square feet as the appropriate size for this type of cell.60 As the
appended charts further showed, the federal government in the early 1980s
was still adhering to what the amicus brief called a “firm federal policy
that there be no double celling in long-term correctional facilities.”61 The
Commission’s Manual of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions
embraced the same standards.
In many respects the one-person, one-cell norm was a product of the
golden age of prison sociology. Studies by sociologists like Gresham
Sykes and Sheldon Messinger established in vivid terms the pains of
imprisonment and the loss of the major anchor points of adult identity in
prison.62 From this perspective, the single cell was much more than an
issue of comfort or discomfort. Taking people already reeling from the
degradation ceremonies surrounding incarceration, and placing them in a
cell with another inmate—someone likely in prison because of anti-social
behavior and attitudes—risked a “loss of dignity” and “profound attacks on
the [prisoner’s] image or sense of personal worth.”63
Penal experts also emphasized the danger of violence. Prisons in the
1970s and 1980s were already undergoing profound transformation even
60

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1–2, Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337 (No. 80-332).
Id. at 2.
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Brief of Respondents at 22, Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337 (No. 80-332).
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before the arrival of the mass incarceration generation. The breakdown of
the old industrial model of prison labor placed greater strain on the inmate
social order to address the boredom and deprivations associated with
incarceration without the socializing benefits of the barter economy, which
a production-oriented prison labor system allowed.65 This was considerably
exacerbated by racial transformation, as a once overwhelmingly white
prison population became more closely divided.66 The result was a tense
brew of race-based prisoner organizations, some of them inspired by social
change and revolutionary politics.67 Nor was the potential for violence
theoretical in 1980. The Attica uprising and the massacre that followed the
retaking of the prison highlighted the powerful tensions both uniting and
dividing prisoners in older state prisons suffering from the older style
prison overcrowding.68 Far from being abstract or aspirational, the district
court in Rhodes listened to prison experts that were extremely concerned
about the potential for violence at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility
(SOCF).69 After another decade of worsening overcrowding, those
concerns were realized when prisoners’ resentment over medical care
issues led to one of the worst riots and longest prison takeovers in
contemporary correctional history.
B. The Court’s Uncomfortable Prison Standard
The district court’s order in Rhodes, which barred the use of double
celling at SOCF except for emergencies,70 was a clear example of the kind
of overreach by federal courts in reforming state prisons that was
becoming a common complaint from state and federal politicians.71 This
would in the 1990s lead to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, formally
limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts over state prison defendants.72
The order amounted to a per se rule against double celling, establishing a
single cell as an Eighth Amendment right.73 Instead of being based on
careful fact-finding, this per se rule was imposed by the district court based
64
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Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1016–17 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff’d, 624 F.2d 1099 (6th
Cir. 1980)), rev’d, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
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Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 367 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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E.g., Wendell Rawls Jr., Judges’ Authority in Prison Reform Attacked, N.Y. TIMES (May 18,
1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/18/us/judges-authority-prison-reform-attacked-courts-trial-thi
rd-four-articles-efforts.html [https://perma.cc/HPU6-RKSL].
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Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(b),
3626 (2012), and in sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
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on abstract standards taken from aspirational documents. From this
perspective, the case fits into the broader backlash against judicial activism
that was coming from the Supreme Court, and later Congress, around the
prison issue during the 1980s and 1990s.75 In retrospect, we can also see
that the case reflects, at best, a profound misunderstanding by the Supreme
Court of the transformations in American penality that were producing
mass incarceration.
As a piece of judicial review, Rhodes is a stunning if utterly
disingenuous piece of de novo review of facts. Cherry-picking a couple of
phrases and facts from a tremendously rich and complicated record, the
majority and concurrences recast the entire findings, and then
unceremoniously found that the district court had abused its discretion by
ignoring this new set of findings.76 The district court found SOCF a prison
saddled with a permanent overpopulation of nearly 40% and likely to
grow, which was overwhelming the few forms of out of cell prison activity
available to prisoners, raising the risk of violence throughout the prison,
and forcing a large minority of prisoners to coexist inside their cell with
another prisoner.77 The district court found it significant that most SOCF
prisoners were there on long terms, calling for life or a long determinate
sentence, and that they had typically been convicted of violent crimes or
had been transferred from other prisons due to behavior problems.78
It was in this context of a maximum-security prison holding long-term
prisoners with serious risks of behavior problems that the district court
found double celling caused an unacceptable risk of “physical and mental
injury from long term exposure.”79 As Justice Marshall wrote in his
spirited dissent, “the facility described by the majority is not the one
involved in this case.”80 Instead, without visiting the prison or bothering to
reference much of the record, Justice Powell described a prison that was
recently built and “top flight” at that.81 A place, in line with modern
correctional goals, that included a library, gymnasiums, and classrooms.82
The Court acknowledged the reality of double celling, but dismissed this as
a minor problem.83 The Court seemed particularly taken with the fact that
See id. (citing the National Sheriff’s Association Handbook on Jail Architecture, the National
Sheriff’s Association Manual on Jail Administration, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency
Model Act for the Protection of the Rights of Prisoners, and the Report of the Special Civilian
Committee for the study of the United States Army Confinement System).
75
See generally LYNCH, supra note 5.
76
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 339–69 (1981).
77
Id. at 343, 349 n.14.
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Id. at 343.
79
Id. (citing Chapman, 434 F. Supp. at 1021).
80
Id. at 369–70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 340 (quoting Chapman, 434 F. Supp. at 1009).
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Id. at 337.
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SOCF organized its cells in the modern pod style around day rooms that
allowed a common area for television, games, and recreational activities;84
ignoring the fact that use of these common areas might in fact be quite high
risk for an overcrowded and tense prison population riven along racial
lines.85 For the Court, the absence of a proven relationship between the
prison population rise and the rate of violence made irrelevant the district
court’s detailed assessment of the views of experts for both sides on the
threat of violence.86 In this light, the double celling standard amounted to a
requirement that prisons be comfortable. Yet, even assuming the “theory
that double celling inflicts pain,” the majority saw no constitutional
violation.87 Instead, they were willing to stipulate that the Constitution
does not “mandate comfortable prisons” and that prisons like SOCF
“cannot be free of discomforts.”88
C. The Rhodes to Mass Incarceration
For distinguishing purposes, it is attractive going forward to embrace
the Court’s dominant narrative of the case. If the district court in Rhodes
had sinned by placing an abstract aspirational right on a record devoid of
actual evidence of mental and physical suffering, the case left plenty of
room for other district courts, so inclined to ignore Rhodes’ light of very
different kinds of findings.89 In retrospect, however, Rhodes should be seen
as significant for its deliberate effort to ignore the mounting signs that
American penology was undergoing change. For decades, state prison
systems had been focused officially on rehabilitation, and in some states
departments of corrections were created after World War II to promote
professionalization and treatment orientation.90 The Federal Bureau of
Prisons in particular, after the harsh years of Alcatraz in the 1930s and
1940s, became highly treatment oriented in the 1960s and 1970s with a
model for highly modern, secure, and treatment-oriented prisons with little

84

Id. at 341.
See, e.g., CAL. STATE AUDITOR, HIGH RISK UPDATE—PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT AND THE
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION (2015), https://www.auditor.ca.
gov/pdfs/reports/2015-609and2015-610.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9YY-WZN5].
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Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347–50.
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Id. at 348–49.
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Id.
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Indeed, Margo Schlanger’s work shows that despite Rhodes, prisoner litigation remained quite
active until the Prison Litigation Reform Act gave rise to a sharp decline in 1995. Margo Schlanger,
Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 6, 1555–706 (2003).
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See, e.g., 1940–1945, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/timeline/19401945.html [https://perma.cc/HQV7-47PY] (displaying the post-war founding of the Florida
Department); Historical Timeline, TENN. DEP’T CORRECTION, https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/corr
ection/attachments/HistoricalTimeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/DAL7-8BH7] (indicating the bifurcation of
two older departments post-war to form the Department of Correction).
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overcrowding. The individualized orientation of punishment in these
states, coupled with parole and the existence of a much larger public
mental health system, also meant that those with serious mental health
problems could be channeled out of the prison system.92
Although only a few years into the new more punitive era, the record
in Rhodes suggests the new elements that would come to define mass
incarceration, including rapid population growth (the prison opened in
1972 and was overcrowded by 1975),93 the concentration of long-term
prisoners with declining opportunities for release,94 and the large numbers
of prisoners who were entering with a known history of serious mental
illness.95 The Supreme Court chose to ignore these warnings and treated
the overcrowding problem at SOCF as a modest difficulty in the face of
what was otherwise a “top-flight first-class facility.”96 The Court dismissed
permanent overcrowding as irrelevant unless the record showed actual
breakdowns in essential infrastructures or provisions like food.97 The Court
ignored the building mental health crisis with the reassurance that there
was “no evidence of indifference by SOCF staff to inmates’ mental or
dental needs.”98 The only problems the Court acknowledged were in the
dilution of programs that were arguably rehabilitative.99 To treat delays in
delivery of rehabilitative services as cruel and unusual punishment would
be to “wrench the Eighth Amendment from its language and its history.”100
The case was doctrinally significant, the Court’s first occasion to
review what was framed as a “pure conditions case,” i.e., not raising other
evidence of abuse (like excessive use of force).101 Rights advocates and the
liberal justices who concurred likely were relieved that the increasingly
conservative majority had not called into question the legitimacy of this

91

See Historical Information, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/history/
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class of Eighth Amendment cases, instead setting a seemingly higher bar
for proof of actual harm.103 In retrospect, the case signaled a chill on
protection of prisoner rights in state prisons just as the states were moving
rapidly away from rehabilitation and mechanisms like parole, toward a
system of uncontrolled growth, mass incarceration, and chronic/hyper
overcrowding.104 Not only did the majority miss the last chance to stop
mass incarceration in its tracks, their singular failure to recognize the
emerging elements placed their call for greater deference to state officials
directly in the stream of an independent shift by state officials toward
indifference to the well-being of prisoners. Just as the federal judiciary
needed to be alerted to an emerging threat to human dignity, the Court used
the occasion of this particularly sharp dressing down of a federal trial judge
to encourage those courts to stand down.
In discharging this oversight responsibility, however, courts
cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are
insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the
perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve the
goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system: to
punish justly, to deter future crime, and to return imprisoned
persons to society with an improved change of being useful,
law-abiding citizens.105
IV. THE NEW OVERCROWDING AS A NEW PENOLOGY
To a striking degree, the record in Rhodes anticipates the full flowering
of mass incarceration including: the flow of prisoners with serious mental
problems, the permanence of overcrowding and double celling, new
prisons that are relatively decent in terms of food, heat, and shelter, but
which increasingly lack the ability to deliver services.106 Most importantly,
Rhodes opened the door to chronic hyper overcrowding of the sort
manifest in the Rhodes record but unrecognized by the Court.107
A decade later in an article titled, The New Penology: The Emerging
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103

2016]

THE NEW OVERCROWDING

1209

108

Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, Malcolm Feeley and I
argued that the rise of historically unprecedented prison populations was
forcing an abandonment of traditional penological concerns with
punishment, rehabilitation, and deterrence, creating instead a new
penology based on managing whole populations through control strategies
aimed at risk and variable security levels of custody.109 The hardening of
chronic hyper overcrowding embedded this new penology deep into
contemporary correctional practice.110 The new overcrowding reshaped
routine prison life and organization.111 A new style of post-rehabilitative
prison aimed at maximizing the numbers of people confined with attention
only to security.112 A new emergency style of governing prisons made
security the only consideration and promoted ways of dealing with
prisoners as a mass, and through collective forms of punishment like
lockdowns, riot tactics, and special weapons.113
A. The New Post-Rehabilitative Prison
The new model of imprisonment in California and other states
removed any elements of rehabilitation from the prison experience and
removed parole as an incentive for good behavior or a way to reduce the
prison population.114 Instead, the singular goal of imprisonment was
becoming incapacitation, the premise that once incarcerated, the person
imprisoned could not commit crimes against the public safety.115 As a
result, the new prisons that were built during the 1980s and 1990s lacked
serious attention to health, education, or treatment; they were supersized
containers for prisoners of various risk levels.116
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Unlike SOCF, these prisons were built with the expectation that they
would be double celled routinely and that the infrastructure could hold
even more prisoners without threat to basic health and safety.118 Soon, even
the day areas that the Supreme Court had found so important as a safety
valve in Rhodes were placed into use as large dormitories with so-called
“bad beds”—three level bunk beds spaced inches apart in the former day
use areas of the prison.119 In echoes of Rhodes, but this time unchallenged
by the majority on the Supreme Court, a special three judge trial court in
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger found that in those conditions, “inmate-oninmate violence is almost impossible to prevent, infectious diseases spread
more easily, and lockdowns are sometimes the only means by which to
maintain control.”120
B. Emergency Government
The expert witnesses in Coleman-Plata testified that the super-sized
nature of California’s prisons made them virtually impossible to manage
through ordinary correctional methods when they were not overcrowded
and impossible to govern without a state of emergency once they became
chronically hyper overcrowded.121 Internally, wardens had to fall back on
lockdowns to address frequent breakdowns in order—transforming every
level of incarceration into the supermax-like experience of being in cell or
bunk twenty-three hours or more a day.122
C. Security as a Singular Value
What is a prison that is not concerned about security? The prisons of
mass incarceration, designed as post-rehabilitative warehouses and driven
through overcrowding to governing by emergency, are thrown back on
security in a way that is all but exclusive of other values. Overcrowding
forces all considerations other than security inside the prison to recede, as
overtaxed managers turn from one crisis to another.123 This
emergency/security ethos feeds back into a correctional culture among
staff that emphasizes weapons, riot suppression, and labeling of prisoners
See Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 (S.D. Ohio 1977)), aff’d, 624 F.2d 1099
(6th Cir. 1980)), rev’d, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (describing how increased prison populations forced the
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility to double-cell inmates).
118
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119
Id. at 113–14.
120
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4,
2009) (final opinion and order, combined with Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH (N.D. Cal
Aug. 4, 2009)).
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as threats without human features of vulnerabilities. This emergency
ethos was replicated at the system level when the Governor himself placed
the entire system under a state of emergency in 2006 in order to use
extraordinary powers to move some prisoners out of state and into private
prisons.125
V. BROWN V. PLATA: THE BIRTH OF A
NEW OVERCROWDING JURISPRUDENCE?
Brown v. Plata,126 which upheld a sweeping population reduction order
against California’s chronic hyper overcrowding after finding that relieving
overcrowding was essential to remedying existing systemic constitutional
violations for failure to provide adequate mental healthcare127 and failure to
provide adequate medical care,128 casts no direct doubt on the validity of
Rhodes v. Chapman.129 Yet a careful reading of Plata suggests that the
Court may be prepared over time to reduce Rhodes to its facts by
recognizing the validity of remedying overcrowding. While Rhodes v.
Chapman is only mentioned twice in the opinion (once by the majority to
distinguish it, and once by Justice Alito in dissent to apply it and overrule
the lower court),130 overcrowding is mentioned more than seventy times,
more than sixty in the majority opinion alone. A big part of the reason is
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),131 a law that reflects the postRhodes ethos of mistrust of federal court interventions in state prison
systems (one that grew directly out of state anger over overcrowding
litigation much like Rhodes).132 Without naming overcrowding, the PLRA
singles out prison population reduction orders for more exacting burdens.
Since overcrowding is certain to be the mediating condition, which
precipitates a judicial decision that a population reduction remedy is
necessary, this part of the law is, in effect, statutory protection of state
prison overcrowding, which provides further evidence that this
124
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constitutional norm (or non-norm under current jurisprudence) may be of
singular importance in ending mass incarceration. Under the PLRA, the
three-judge court (itself a special burden requiring more judges to agree
before a population reduction order) must make a series of findings about
the necessity and effect order.133
Plata is most visible in the decision in the remarkably different way
that the majority chooses to read the record here, acknowledging many of
the very things that the Supreme Court sneeringly dismissed in Rhodes. In
part, this reflects the Court’s recognition that mass incarceration itself has
changed the nature of the prison and the presumptions about state expertise
and state democratic accountability that influenced the Rhodes decision. In
what follows, I read Plata as a turn in the road of Supreme Court prison
conditions precedent that could lead, not especially fast, to a reduction of
Rhodes to its facts.
A. Discomfort, Torture, and Dignity
The majority opinion in Plata reads like the opinion Justice Marshall
might have written in Rhodes. Overcrowding is recognized to be a matter
not of discomfort, but of disease, disability, delay in treatment, and
resulting pain and death. The threat of violence, and the inability of
correctional officers to offer realistic hope of rescue given the triple bunk
“bad bed” sections of the prison is seen as a real one. Interestingly, here the
Court does not demand statistical showings that the violence is more than
what you would expect based on the increased population.
One major difference is simply the scale of overcrowding. The figure
chosen by the three-judge court in the district court decision leading up to
Plata as the target for reducing overcrowding sufficiently to permit remedy
of the unconstitutional conditions was 137.5%,134 the precise level of
overcrowding recognized by the Court as not a violation in Rhodes. This is
perhaps a coincidence, but it may also reflect the enduring precedential
influence of Rhodes that the Court did not accept the prisoners’ argument
for reducing overcrowding altogether. However, the record established that
for most of the period in contestation, California had operated at more than
200% of design capacity—and in various prisons closer to 300%.135 While
the Supreme Court could treat some level of double celling as unlikely to
undermine the basic decency of the correctional regime in Rhodes, the total
uniformity of double and triple celling, as well as the “bad beds,” placed
California in a different place. The Court in Plata seemed to signal just this
133

18 U.S.C. § 3626 (a)(2)(B) (2012).
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351 THE, 2010 WL
99000, at *1 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010).
135
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1924, 1934.
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in appending three photographs to the majority opinion, two of them
depicting the “bad bed” sections.
The second major difference is the super-salience of mental illness as
well as other chronic physical illnesses and disabilities. While there was
evidence in the Rhodes record that more prisoners were entering SOCF
with serious mental illnesses136 the Plata case reflected a record built up
over some twenty years of litigation on mental health,137 and nearly fifteen
on medical care.138 The characterization of the prison population as
severely disease-burdened139 and the continuing independent court findings
on the failure of California to provide adequate medical care140 changed the
nature of the overcrowding conversation. Overcrowding in these
conditions, with this level of disease burden, truly risks tortuous suffering
and the ever-present risk of the same. The new overcrowding, with its
chronically ill prisoner population, creates what I have called “torture on
the installment plan,”141 which blurs the line between discomfort and
torture—what may be discomfort to a healthy prisoner becomes torture to
an unhealthy one.142
The Rhodes opinion went out of its way to minimize talk of human
dignity and humanity under the Eighth Amendment;143 the Plata opinion
amplified them, noting that prisoners have a right to “human dignity” that
survives their imprisonment and which prisons must respect.144 If, as
Justice Kennedy stated in Plata, “dignity animates the Eighth
See Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff’d, 624 F.2d 1099 (6th
Cir. 1980), rev’d, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (“[A] substantial number of the inmates are victims of some
form of mental disorder. One expert testified that in a maximum security prison of any size some 15%
of the inmates may be expected to be schizophrenic.”).
137
See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1926 (outlining Coleman v. Brown, which commenced in the 1990s
and involved a class of seriously mentally ill California prisoners).
138
See id. at 1926–27 (outlining Plata v. Brown, which commenced in 2001 and involved a class
of state prisoners with serious medical conditions).
139
See id. at 1927 (citing a report that found overcrowding to increase the incidence of infectious
disease in a California prison); id. at 1933 (“A medical expert described living quarters . . . where large
numbers of prisoners may share just a few toilets and showers, as ‘breeding grounds for disease.’”); id.
at 1933 n.7 (recounting the testimony of corrections officials who described outbreaks of disease,
including one who described widespread staph infections among prisoners, recalling that they were
“bleeding, oozing with pus that is soaking through their clothes when they come in to get the wound
covered and treated”).
140
Id. at 1922 (“This case arises from serious constitutional violations in California’s prison
system. The violations have persisted for years. They remain uncorrected.”).
141
SIMON, supra note 14.
142
Id.
143
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346–47 (1981) (discussing Eighth Amendment
analysis, noting that it prohibits punishments which “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,” but failing to mention human dignity or humanity in its analysis).
144
See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (“Prisoners retain the essence of human
dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment”).
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Amendment,”
it is possible that overcrowding violates the Eighth
Amendment whenever it subjects the prisoner to experiences that ordinary
members of the non-imprisoned society would experience as a serious
insult to their humanity. This includes being forced to urinate and defecate
in the direct visual and audible presence of others, being denied access to
visits and educational opportunities in prison during prolonged lockdowns,
or being deprived of decent facilities to clean one’s self.
145

B. Democracy and Distrust
Even if Plata broke no new Eighth Amendment grounds, its contrast
with Rhodes in its approach to deference to state elected and appointed
officials is noteworthy.146 Rhodes went out of its way to instruct trial
judges not to “assume that state legislatures and prison officials are
insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal
function in the criminal justice system.”147 Below, the three-judge trial
court explicitly recognized the pathological politics of mass incarceration
as relevant to their decision to order that the state produce a populationreduction plan:
Tough-on-crime politics have increased the population of
California’s prisons dramatically while making necessary
reforms impossible. As a result the state’s prisons have
become places “of extreme peril to the safety of persons”
they house, while contributing little to the safety of
California residents.148
While the Supreme Court did not repeat this observation, the majority
was quick to dismiss the state’s argument that they should be trusted to
resolve the problem. They cited the state of emergency declared by the
then-sitting governor,149 as well as the findings of a state commission that
overcrowding was an extreme danger,150 as indicators that the state did not
145

Id.
Compare id. at 1928 (“Courts must be sensitive to . . . the need for deference to experienced
and expert prison administrators faced with the difficult and dangerous task of housing large numbers
of convicted criminals.”), with Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 361–62 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court
and the lower courts have been especially deferential to prison authorities . . . . Courts must and do
recognize the primacy of legislative and executive authorities in the administration of prisons; however,
if the prison authorities do not conform to constitutional minima, the courts are under an obligation to
take steps to remedy the violations.”).
147
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352.
148
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 887 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citations omitted).
149
See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1924 (“In 2006, then-Governor Schwarzenegger declared a state of
emergency in the prisons, as ‘immediate action is necessary to prevent death and harm caused by
California’s severe prison overcrowding.’”).
150
Id.
146
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have the situation under control and was unable to act effectively without
judicial intervention.151
VI. CONCLUSION: A SINGLE CELL RULE IN THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court noted that there was no “one
man, one cell” principle “lurking” in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment,152 and in Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court pointedly refused to
recognize a constitutional right to comfortable prisons.153 If overcrowding
was too diffuse a harm to receive constitutional protection under the
(perhaps already imaginary) conditions of late penal welfarism in SOCF,
then the new overcrowding, with its permanence, its hypertrophic status,
and its operation within a prison estate built without concerns for
rehabilitation and filled with a disease-burdened prison population proved
to be a different circumstance. The line between discomfort and torture
simply cannot be drawn under such conditions.
There are many sound public policy arguments to support this, as there
were in 1981 when the Supreme Court rejected the views of the
Department of Justice and the American Correctional Association.154
Today, we know much more about the perverse consequences of degrading
conditions on future compliance with the law.155 The new overcrowding
assures that degrading treatment is a routine feature of imprisonment in
America, a factor that may explain why our recidivism rates are roughly
twice what they were in the 1970s.156 But even if policymakers should
continue to believe that crude incapacitation is the best value they can
obtain from prisons, they must still operate them in a way that preserves
essential human dignity. A fair and balanced look at the evidence today
about what prison life is like in the warehouse prisons of mass
See id. at 1923 (noting that although the conditions of California prisons have “fallen short of
minimum constitutional requirements” for years, judicial intervention was appropriate because no
remedy had proven sufficient).
152
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979).
153
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
154
See id. at 356 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that the Justice Department, among other
authorities, recommended sixty square feet of space per prisoner as the minimal acceptable standard);
id. at 343 n.7 (majority opinion) (noting that the trial court accepted contemporary studies regarding
living quarters space in correctional institutions, including one by the American Correctional
Association that recommended a minimum of sixty square feet).
155
See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 14 (2002) (“[D]eference develops . . . when people are
treated fairly by legal authorities, and people’s willingness to consent and cooperate with legal
authorities is rooted in their judgments about the degree to which those authorities are using fair
procedures.”).
156
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1850–1984 (1996), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hcsus5084.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7J8-NGLQ];
Reentry Trends in the U.S., BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/content/reentry/recidivism.cfm
[https://perma.cc/VJ5B-URYN].
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incarceration suggests that conserving dignity requires a room of one’s
own.

